Navigation überspringen.

Journal of Indian Philosophy 2009 - 37,2-4

Journal of Indian Philosophy
Journal of Indian philosophy / Editor-in-Chief: Phyllis Granoff. - Dordrecht [u.a.] : Springer [u.a.].
Erscheinungsverlauf: 1.1970/72 -
ISSN 0022-1791 (Printausg.)
ISSN 1573-0395 (Online-Ausg.)
URL: Homepage
URL: Online-Ausg. (Springerlink)

Inhalt: 37, 2-4 (April-August 2009)

  • Ronald M. Davidson: „Studies in Dhāraṇī Literature I: Revisiting the Meaning of the Term Dhāraṇī“. - In: Journal of Indian Philosophy. - 37 (2009), 2, S. 97-147. DOI: 10.1007/s10781-008-9054-8
    Abstract: The Mahāyāna Buddhist term dhāraṇī has been understood to be problematic since the mid-nineteenth century, when it was often translated as “magical phrase” or “magical formula” and was considered to be emblematic of tantric Buddhism. The situation improved in contributions by Bernhard, Lamotte and Braarvig, and the latter two suggested the translation be “memory,” but this remained difficult in many environments. This paper argues that dhāraṇī is a function term denoting “codes/coding,” so that the category dhāraṇī is polysemic and context-sensitive. After reviewing Western scholarship, the article discusses dhāraṇī semantic values and issues of synonymy, the early applications of mantras, the sonic/graphic background of coding in India extended into Buddhist applications, and the soteriological ideology of dhāraṇīs along with some of its many varieties.

  • S. K. Arun Murthi: „The Mūlāvidyā Controversy Among Advaita Vedāntins: was Śaṅkara Himself Responsible?“. - In: Journal of Indian Philosophy. - 37 (2009), 2, S. 149-177. DOI: 10.1007/s10781-008-9053-9
    Abstract: The concept of avidyā or ignorance is central to the Advaita Vedāntic position of Śȧnkara. The post-Śaṅkara Advaitins wrote sub-commentaries on the original texts of Śaṅkara with the intention of strengthening his views. Over the passage of time the views of these sub-commentators of Śaṅkara came to be regarded as representing the doctrine of Advaita particularly with regard to the concept of avidyā. Swami Satchidanandendra Saraswati, a scholar-monk of Holenarsipur, challenged the accepted tradition through the publication of his work Mūlāvidyānirāsaḥ, particularly with regard to the avidyādoctrine. It was his contention that the post-Śaṅkara commentators brought their own innovations particularly on the nature of avidyā. This was the idea of mūlāvidyā or ‘root ignorance’, a positive entity which is the material cause of the phenomenal world. Saraswati argues that such an idea of mūlāvidyā is not to be found in the bhāṣyas (commentaries) of Śaṅkara and is foisted upon Śaṅkara. This paper attempts to show that although Śaṅkara may not have explicitly favoured such a view of mūlāvidyā, his lack of clarity on the nature of avidyā left enough scope for the post-Śaṅkara commentators to take such a position on avidyā.

  • Jeson Woo: „Gradual and Sudden Enlightenment: The Attainment of Yogipratyakṣa in the Later Indian Yogācāra School". - In: Journal of Indian Philosophy. - 37 (2009), 2, S. 179-188. DOI: 10.1007/s10781-008-9061-9
    Abstract In the later Indian Yogācāra school, yogipratyakṣa, the cognition of yogins is a key concept used to explain the Buddhist goal of enlightenment. It arises through the practice of meditation upon the Four Noble Truths. The method of the practice is to contemplate their aspects with attention (sādara), without interruption (nairantarya), and over a long period of time (dīrghakāla). A problem occurs in this position since Buddhists hold the theory of momentariness: how is possible that a yogin attains yogipratyakṣa even when everything arises and perishes moment by moment. It is not possible for the momentary mind to fix on the object. Neither is the intensification of the practice possible in a stream composed of cognitions different at each moment. To provide a solution of this problem, a renown eleventh century Buddhist logician, Jñānaśrīmitra, assures us that momentariness is incompatible with duration (sthāyitā), but not with the occurrence of dissimilarity (visadṛśotpāda). Even if cognitions are momentary, the vividness of an object continues to intensify in the course of each preceding cognition-moment producing, in turn, its following moment. Jñānaśrīmitra discusses the attainment of yogipratyakṣa in terms of Buddhist ontological distinctions of moment (kṣaṇa) and continuum (santāna). At the level of the continuum, the process of enlightenment is considered gradual. By retaining a strict adherence to the final moment of the practice, on the other hand, the process is considered sudden.

  • Sthaneshwar Timalsina: „The Brahman and the Word Principle (Śabda)“. - In: Journal of Indian Philosophy. - 37 (2009), 3, S. 189-206. DOI: 10.1007/s10781-009-9065-0
    Abstract: The literature of Bhartṛhari and Maṇḍana attention in contemporary times. The writings of the prominent linguistic philosopher and grammarian Bhartṛhari and of Manḍana, an encyclopedic scholar of later seventh century and most likely a senior contemporary of Śaṅkara, shape Indian philosophical thinking to a great extent. On this premise, this study of the influence of Bhartṛhari on Maṇḍana’s literature, the scope of this essay, allows us to explore the significance of Bhartṛhari’s writings, not only to comprehend the philosophy of language, but also to understand the contribution of linguistic philosophy in shaping Advaita philosophy in subsequent times. This comparison is not to question originality on the part of Maṇḍana, but rather to explore the interrelationship between linguistic philosophy and the monistic philosophy of the Upaniṣadic tradition. Besides excavating the role of Bhartṛhari writings on the texts of Maṇḍana, analysis this will reveal the interrelatedness of the Advaita school of Śaṅkara often addressed as ‘pure non-dualism’ (Kevalādvaita) and the Advaita of Bhartṛhari, identified as ‘non-dualism of the word-principle’ (Śabdādvaita).

  • Frances Garrett: „The Alchemy of Accomplishing Medicine (sman sgrub): Situating the Yuthok Heart Essence (G.yu thog snying thig) in Literature and History“. - In: Journal of Indian Philosophy. - 37 (2009), 3, S. 207-230. DOI: 10.1007/s10781-009-9070-3
    Abstract: This essay examines historical and contemporary connections between Buddhist and medical traditions through a study of the Accomplishing Medicine (sman sgrub) practice and the Yuthok Heart Essence (G.yu thog snying thig) anthology. Accomplishing Medicine is an esoteric Buddhist yogic and contemplative exercise focused on several levels of “alchemical” transformation. The article will trace the acquisition of this practice from India by Tibetan medical figures and its assimilation into medical practice. It will propose that this alchemical practice forms the central nexus of connection between Tibetan medicine and the Buddhist Nyingma tradition, and that this little-studied link is not a marginal feature of Tibetan medicine but rather one that has had a significant shaping factor on each tradition throughout history.

  • Will Rasmussen: „The Realism of Universals in Plato and Nyāya“. - In: Journal of Indian Philosophy. - 37 (2009), 3, S. 231-252. DOI: 10.1007/s10781-008-9060-x
    Abstract It has become commonplace in introductions to Indian philosophy to construe Plato’s discussion of forms (εἶδος/ἰδέα) and the treatment in Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika of universals (sāmānya/jāti) as addressing the same philosophical issue, albeit in somewhat different ways. While such a comparison of the similarities and differences has interest and value as an initial reconnaissance of what each says about common properties, an examination of the roles that universals play in the rest of their philosophical enquiries vitiates this commonplace. This paper draws upon the primary texts to identify the following metaphysical, epistemological, semantic and soteriological roles that universals play in the philosophy of Plato and of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika:
    Metaphysical: causal of the existence of x

    Metaphysical: constitutive of the identity/essence of x

    Epistemological: cognitively causal (i.e. of the cognition of one over many)

    Epistemological: epistemically causal (i.e. of knowledge of x)

    Semantic: necessary condition of speech and reason

    Epistemological: vindicatory of induction (Nyāya only)

    Metaphysical: explanatory of causation (Nyāya only)

    Soteriological: cathartic contemplation (Plato only)

    These roles provide us with motivations or reasons to believe that universals exist. As we examine these motivations, we find pressures mounting against our assimilating Platonic forms and the universals of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika in the discourse about common properties. It is especially when we appreciate the utterly different contribution that universals make in securing our highest welfare that we realize how Plato and the two sister schools are not so much talking somewhat differently about the same thing, but talking somewhat similarly about different things. This better understanding of this difference in these philosophies opens a route for our better understanding of their unique contributions in the ongoing dialogue of philosophy.

  • Minoru Hara: „Divine Witness“. - In: Journal of Indian Philosophy. - 37 (2009), 3, S. 253-272. DOI: 10.1007/s10781-009-9068-x
    Abstract: When People were falsely accused, and yet there existed no human means to testify to the truth, to whom did they resort for the final judgment? In ancient India, it was a sort of ordeal (divya), which was inseparable from oath (śapatha) and act of truth (satya-kriyā). Here we present some examples and investigate who appear in these contexts. As a result, we could classify them into (1) mahā−bhuūta (fire, wind, water, etc.), (2) heavenly bodies (sun moon, etc.), (3) inner principles (heart, soul, etc.) and (4) gods (Agni, Vāyu, Indra, Yama, etc.). All these witnesses observe (paś-) the act of a human being, right as well as wrong, either transcendently from above like the sun, or immanently from inside like wind which circulates human body in the form of vital breath.

  • Douglas Osto: „The Supreme Array Scripture: A New Interpretation of the Title “Gaṇḍavyūha-sūtra”“. - In: Journal of Indian Philosophy. - 37 (2009), 3, S. 273-290. DOI: 10.1007/s10781-008-9056-6
    Abstract: This article argues for a new interpretation of the Sanskrit compound gaṇḍa-vyūha as it is used in the common title of the Mahāyāna text the Gaṇḍavyūha-Sūtra.The author begins by providing a brief history of the sūtra’s appellations in Chinese and Tibetan sources. Next, the meanings of gaṇḍa (the problematic member of the compound) are explored. The author proposes that contemporary scholars have overlooked a meaning of gaṇḍa occurring in some compounds, wherein gaṇḍa can mean simply “great,” “big” or “massive.” This general sense is particularly common in the compound gaṇda-śaila (a “massive rock” or “boulder”) and is found in such texts as the Bhāgavata Purāṇa, the Harivaṃśa and the Harṣacarita. Following the discussion of Gaṇḍa, the author examines the term vyūha (“array”) as it is used in the Gaṇḍavyūha-sūtra. The article concludes with the suggestion that a more appropriate translation of the Gaṇḍavyūha-sūtra would be “The Supreme array Scripture.”

  • Alastair R. McGlashan: „The Tiruttoṇṭar Tiruvantāti of Nampi Āṇṭār Nampi“. - In: Journal of Indian Philosophy. - 37 (2009), 3, S. 291-310. DOI: 10.1007/s10781-009-9069-9
    Abstract: This paper presents an English translation from the original Tamil of the canonical Saivite hagiographical work, the Tiruttoṇṭar Tiruvantāti of Nampi Āṇṭār Nampi. The date of this work is disputed, but it was probably composed at some point between 870 and 1118 CE. This classical Tamil poem gives in summary form the lives of the sixty three Saivite saints of the sixth to ninth centuries known as the Nāyaṉmār, or Tiruttoṇṭar (“holy servants”, sc. of the Lord Siva). The paper also includes an Introduction, setting out the context of the poem and its place in the Saivite literary tradition from which the Saiva Siddhanta philosophy subsequently developed, and Notes which explain the mythological and other references which the poem contains.

  • Shayne Clarke: „Locating Humour in Indian Buddhist Monastic Law Codes: A Comparative Approach“. - In: Journal of Indian Philosophy. - 37 (2009), 4, S. 311-330. DOI: 10.1007/s10781-008-9052-x
    Abstract: It has been claimed that Indian Buddhism, as opposed to East Asian Chan/Zen traditions, was somehow against humour. In this paper I contend that humour is discernible in canonical Indian Buddhist texts, particularly in Indian Buddhist monastic law codes (Vinaya). I will attempt to establish that what we find in these texts sometimes is not only humourous but that it is intentionally so. I approach this topic by comparing different versions of the same narratives preserved in Indian Buddhist monastic law codes.

  • Jonathan Duquette / K. Ramasubramanian: „Anyathākhyāti: A Critique by Appaya Dīkṣita in the Parimala“. - In: Journal of Indian Philosophy. - 37 (2009), 4, S. 331-347. DOI: 10.1007/s10781-008-9064-6
    Abstract: In this paper, the problem of illusory perception, as approached by the Nyāya and Advaita Vedānta schools of philosophy, is discussed from the standpoint of the Parimala. This seminal work belonging to the Bhāmatī tradition of Advaita Vedānta was composed in the sixteenth century by the polymath Appaya Dīkṣita. In the context of discussing various theories of illusion, Dīkṣita dwells upon the Nyāya theory of anyathākhyāti, and its connection with jñānalakṣaṇapratyāsatti as a causal factor for perception, and closely examines if such an extraordinary (alaukika) perception is tenable to explain illusory perception. He then proceeds to point out the deficiencies of this model and thereby brings to the fore the anirvacanīyakhyāti of Advaitins as the only theory which stands scrutiny.

  • Isabelle Ratié: „Remarks on Compassion and Altruism in the Pratyabhijñā Philosophy“. - In: Journal of Indian Philosophy. - 37 (2009), 4, S. 349-366. DOI: 10.1007/s10781-009-9066-z
    Abstract : According to Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta, a subject who has freed himself from the bondage of individuality is necessarily compassionate, and his action, necessarily altruistic. This article explores the paradoxical aspects of this statement; for not only does it seem contradictory with the Pratyabhijñā’s non-dualism (how can compassion and altruism have any meaning if the various subjects are in fact a single, all-encompassing Self?)—it also implies a subtle shift in meaning as regards the very notion of compassion (karuṇā, kr̥pā), since according to the two Śaivas, compassion does not result from the awareness of the others’ pain (duḥkha)—as in Buddhism—but from the awareness of one’s own bliss (ānanda). The article thus shows that in spite of their radical criticism of traditional ethical categories such as merit (dharma) and demerit (adharma), the two Śaiva philosophers still make use of ethical categories, but not without pro- foundly transforming them.

  • Sthaneshwar Timalsina: „Bhartṛhari and Maṇḍana on Avidyā“. - In: Journal of Indian Philosophy. - 37 (2009), 4, S. 367-382. DOI: 10.1007/s10781-009-9067-y
    Abstract: The concept of avidyā is one of the central categories in the Advaita of Śaṇkara and Maṇḍana. Shifting the focus from māyā, interpreted either as illusion or as the divine power, this concept brings ignorance to the forefront in describing duality and bondage. Although all Advaitins accept avidyā as a category, its scope and nature is interpreted in multiple ways. Key elements in Maṇḍana’s philosophy include the plurality of avidyā, individual selves as its substrate and the Brahman as its field (viṣaya), and the distinction in avidyā between non-apprehension and misapprehension. A closer investigation shows that Maṇḍana is directly influenced by Bhartṛhari’s linguistic non-dualism in developing the concept of avidyā. This study also compares other key constituents such as vivartta and pariṇāma that are relevant to the analysis of avidyā. As the concept of counter-image (pratibimba) emerges as a distinct stream of Advaita subsequent to Maṇḍana, this study also compares the application of pratibimba in the writings of Bhartṛhari and Maṇḍana.

  • Zhihua Yao: „Empty Subject Terms in Buddhist Logic: Dignāga and his Chinese Commentators“. - In: Journal of Indian Philosophy. - 37 (2009), 4, S. 383-398. DOI: 10.1007/s10781-009-9071-2
    Abstract: The problem of empty terms is one of the focal issues in analytic philosophy. Russell’s theory of descriptions, a proposal attempting to solve this problem, attracted much attention and is considered a hallmark of the analytic tradition. Scholars of Indian and Buddhist philosophy, e.g., McDermott, Matilal, Shaw and Perszyk, have studied discussions of empty terms in Indian and Buddhist philosophy. But most of these studies rely heavily on the Nyāya or Navya-Nyāya sources, in which Buddhists are portrayed as opponents to be defeated, and thus do not truly reflect Buddhist views on this issue. The present paper will explore how Dignāga, the founder of Buddhist logic, deals with the issue of empty subject terms. His approach is subtle and complicated. On the one hand, he proposes a method of paraphrase that resembles Russell’s theory of descriptions. On the other, by relying on his philosophy of language—the apoha theory, he tends to fall into a panfictionalism. Through the efforts of his follower Dharmakīrti, the latter approach would become more acceptable among Indian and Tibetan Buddhists. Dignāga’s Chinese commentators, who were free from the influence of Dharmakīrti, dealt with the empty term issue in three ways: (1) by adhering to Dignāga’s method of paraphrase; (2) by allowing exceptions for non-implicative negation; and (3) by indicating the propositional attitude of a given proposition. Among these, the third proved most popular.

  • Christopher Framarin: „The Problem with Pretending: Rāmānuja’s Arguments Against Jīvanmukti“. - In: Journal of Indian Philosophy. - 37 (2009), 4, S. 399-414. DOI: 10.1007/s10781-008-9058-4
    Abstract: In his Brahmasūtrabhāṣya 1.1.4, Rāmānuja argues that the knowledge of the liberated person precludes ignorance and its effects, and therefore precludes the possibility of jīvanmukti (embodied liberation). The Advaitin replies that the knowledge of the liberated is consistent with a certain kind of karma that prolongs embodiment, hence jīvanmukti is possible. In his Bhagavadgītābhāṣya 2.12, however, Rāmānuja points out that even if the jīvanmukta (embodied liberated person) still experiences appearances, he does not count them as reasons for acting, and therefore does not act. Hence Rāmānuja’s objection to jīvanmukti is both conceptual and practical, and it is the practical problem that is the more difficult to resolve.